A general scoring rule
From MaRDI portal
Publication:433802
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006zbMath1243.91036OpenAlexW2054586910MaRDI QIDQ433802
Publication date: 6 July 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006
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Cites Work
- The Borda majority count
- Positionalist voting functions
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections
- A Characterization of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision
- A Theorem on Utilitarianism
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Relative Utilitarianism
- A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
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