Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
From MaRDI portal
Publication:433814
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.02.003zbMath1243.91035OpenAlexW2010912066MaRDI QIDQ433814
Publication date: 6 July 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.02.003
Related Items (10)
Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference ⋮ Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives ⋮ Upper set rules with binary ranges ⋮ Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain ⋮ Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
Cites Work
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Arrow and Gibbard--Satterthwaite revisited. Extended domains and shorter proofs
- Voting by Committees
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
This page was built for publication: Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
