Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages

DOI10.2307/2171817zbMath0871.90110OpenAlexW2089449012MaRDI QIDQ4339085

Eyal Winter, Daniel J. Seidmann

Publication date: 5 October 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171817

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitysender-receiver gamefully revealing equilibriumcheap talk gamesverifiable message games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Coordination and private information revelation, Hard evidence and mechanism design, Full disclosure in decentralized organizations, Signaling Games, To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question, Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals, Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain., On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals, On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games, Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission, Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult, How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence, Implementation with partial provability, Cheap talk with coarse understanding, A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions, Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification, Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence, Manipulated news model: electoral competition and mass media, Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender, False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad, Receiver's dilemma, The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence, Long persuasion games, Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion, Communication with evidence in the lab, Evidence disclosure and verifiability, Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games, Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes, MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES, Persuasion with communication costs, Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences, Evidence reading mechanisms, Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?, When does centralization undermine adaptation?, Experimental design to persuade, Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types