Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games

DOI10.2307/2171894zbMath0872.90126OpenAlexW2132260710MaRDI QIDQ4340491

John H. Nachbar

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171894

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningrational learningtwo-player discounted repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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