Marriage and Class
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4351425
DOI10.1162/003355397555154zbMath0881.90026OpenAlexW1989898628MaRDI QIDQ4351425
Publication date: 6 October 1997
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/391968cb67acd4f7cbfab288cc978bae37377a17
Related Items (39)
Pre-match investment with frictions ⋮ Over-the-counter trade and the value of assets as collateral ⋮ Role of common preferences in the outcome of many-to-many matching ⋮ Price discrimination and efficient matching ⋮ Inefficient sorting under output sharing ⋮ Pre-matching gambles ⋮ Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality ⋮ Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments ⋮ Separation cycles ⋮ Stable marriages and search frictions ⋮ Dynamically stable matching ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS ⋮ Ranking and search effort in matching ⋮ Search for an object with two attributes ⋮ Strategic mating with common preferences ⋮ A Model of Partnership Formation with Friction and Multiple Criteria ⋮ Exchanging good ideas. ⋮ Dress to impress: brands as status symbols ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility. ⋮ Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity ⋮ Becker's assortative assignments: Stability and fairness ⋮ Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs ⋮ Bargaining in dynamic markets ⋮ Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency ⋮ Matching with noise and the acceptance curse ⋮ Specialization and efficiency with labor-market matching ⋮ Matching with interviews ⋮ Immigration, fertility, and growth ⋮ DIVORCE AND THE OPTION VALUE OF MARITAL SEARCH ⋮ MARRIAGE, MARKETS, AND MONEY: A COASIAN THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION ⋮ Intermediation in markets for goods and markets for assets ⋮ Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences ⋮ On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings ⋮ As Good as Married? A Model of Premarital Cohabitation and Learning ⋮ A note on cohabitation and marriage ⋮ The bargaining trap ⋮ Decentralized matching and social segregation
This page was built for publication: Marriage and Class
