Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
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Publication:4354671
DOI10.2307/2527277zbMath0885.90033OpenAlexW2084897684MaRDI QIDQ4354671
H. Lorne Carmichael, W. Bentley MacLeod
Publication date: 17 September 1997
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp338.pdf
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment ⋮ The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments ⋮ Efficiency may improve when defectors exist ⋮ Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation ⋮ ASYMMETRY OF CUSTOMER LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER ENDOGENOUS PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE* ⋮ Evolution of conditional and unconditional commitment ⋮ Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters
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