Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.09.027zbMath1242.91087OpenAlexW2094681953MaRDI QIDQ435782

Alexander Rasch, Kristina Wiener, Achim Wambach

Publication date: 12 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.027

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionbargainingmechanism designinequity aversiontwo-sided asymmetric information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion ⋮ Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives

This page was built for publication: Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction