Observability and incentive in organizations

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.09.025zbMath1242.91103OpenAlexW2003993574MaRDI QIDQ435795

Bing Ye, Jianyu Yu, Sanxi Li

Publication date: 12 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.025

zbMATH Keywords

observabilityinvestor-owned firmmoral hazard in teamproducer-owned firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

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