Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4359771
DOI10.2307/2171885zbMath0898.90014OpenAlexW1986843894MaRDI QIDQ4359771
Fleurbaey, Marc, François Maniquet
Publication date: 8 November 1998
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171885
non-bossinessstrategy-proofnessno-envyequal treatment of equalsNash implementabilityequity theoryallocation functions
Related Items (11)
Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms ⋮ On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ Procedurally fair implementation under complete information ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation ⋮ On the measurement of plutonomy
This page was built for publication: Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
