Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets

DOI10.2307/2171887zbMath0898.90139OpenAlexW3022519690MaRDI QIDQ4359773

Lin Zhou, Walter Trockel, Robert M. Anderson

Publication date: 8 November 1998

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/cb95ab2aa95c9ff90c2312b17c319c7f0b86d815

zbMATH Keywords

nonconvergencepreferencesbargaining setsindividually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatmentreplica sequence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (10)

Bargaining set and anonymous core without the monotonicity assumption ⋮ The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities ⋮ Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game ⋮ Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets ⋮ Equivalence of the Aubin bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a finite coalition production economy ⋮ Bargaining sets in finite economies ⋮ Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result ⋮ A limit result on bargaining sets ⋮ Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms ⋮ The anonymous core of an exchange economy.

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