Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm

DOI10.1162/003355397555325zbMath0878.90006OpenAlexW2005998587MaRDI QIDQ4360536

Denis Gromb, Fausto Panunzi, Mike Burkart

Publication date: 26 October 1997

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f4d673a13a64270353f7f9e3b7afeb0f4d751fd1

zbMATH Keywords

large outside shareholders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (6)

Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics: toward pure managerial firms? ⋮ Asymmetric information and legal investor protection ⋮ Race to the top or bottom? Corporate governance, freedom of reincorporation and competition in law ⋮ A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates ⋮ Ordinary shares and managers ⋮ Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature

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