The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
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Publication:4367737
DOI10.2307/2171736zbMath0887.90052OpenAlexW2024932067MaRDI QIDQ4367737
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publication date: 2 December 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1147.pdf
Related Items (34)
Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions ⋮ The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue ⋮ The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Matching in the large: an experimental study ⋮ On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in \((k+1)\)-st price common value auctions ⋮ Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders ⋮ On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions ⋮ A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation ⋮ Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets ⋮ On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection ⋮ An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Convergence results for unanimous voting ⋮ Successful uninformed bidding ⋮ Jury theorems with multiple alternatives ⋮ The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities. ⋮ Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids ⋮ Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure ⋮ Tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets ⋮ How effectively do people learn from a variety of different opinions? ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
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