Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
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Publication:4368517
DOI10.2307/2171943zbMath0891.90051OpenAlexW2009935953MaRDI QIDQ4368517
David Martimort, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publication date: 4 December 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/14924/1/Laffont_14924.pdf
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)
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