A Competitive Distribution of Auctions

DOI10.2307/2971742zbMath0890.90043OpenAlexW1981882623MaRDI QIDQ4368671

Michael Peters

Publication date: 4 December 1997

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2971742

zbMATH Keywords

competitive distribution of auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (24)

Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions ⋮ Principal-agent VCG contracts ⋮ Internet auctions with many traders ⋮ Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation ⋮ Robust competitive auctions ⋮ Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets ⋮ Directed Search with Endogenous Capacity ⋮ MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS ⋮ High profit equilibria in directed search models ⋮ On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers ⋮ Indeterminacy and directed search. ⋮ Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search. ⋮ Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets ⋮ Directed search and optimal production ⋮ Competition among auctioneers in large markets ⋮ Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms ⋮ On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition ⋮ Verifiability and group formation in markets ⋮ Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice ⋮ General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment

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