Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship

DOI10.2307/2971717zbMath0889.90042OpenAlexW2105525281MaRDI QIDQ4368684

Roland Strausz

Publication date: 22 June 1998

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/delegation-of-monitoring-in-a-principalagent-relationship(7b745873-4687-47ee-afc3-92d903397360).html

zbMATH Keywords

monitoringprivate informationprincipal-agent relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Optimal contracts with random monitoring ⋮ Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain ⋮ Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy ⋮ Optimal transparency of monitoring capability ⋮ The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity ⋮ Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion ⋮ Managerial ownership with rent-seeking employees ⋮ Dynamic contracts with random monitoring

This page was built for publication: Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship