Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

DOI10.2307/2971722zbMath0891.90001OpenAlexW1587266269MaRDI QIDQ4368689

Geir B. Asheim

Publication date: 4 December 1997

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1128.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

theory of social situationsconsistent planningsubgame-perfectness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (16)

Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model ⋮ On nonexistence of reconsideration-proof equilibrium with state variables ⋮ Continuous quasi-hyperbolic discounting ⋮ Management of a capital stock by Strotz's naive planner ⋮ Optimistic stability in games of perfect information ⋮ Tie-breaking in games of perfect information ⋮ Revision proofness ⋮ The Optimal Equilibrium for Time-Inconsistent Stopping Problems---The Discrete-Time Case ⋮ A theory of (relative) discounting ⋮ The hyperbolic factor: a measure of time inconsistency ⋮ A characterization of sustainability with indicators ⋮ Sweet self-deception ⋮ Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting ⋮ How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity ⋮ Trichotomic discounted utility ⋮ An extension of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time

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