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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364 - MaRDI portal

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4369423

zbMath0968.91500MaRDI QIDQ4369423

William F. Lucas

Publication date: 28 January 1998


Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.



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