Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes

DOI10.1137/S0036144595294515zbMath0890.90188OpenAlexW2064623305MaRDI QIDQ4376202

Michel Balinski, Guillaume Ratier

Publication date: 10 February 1998

Published in: SIAM Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/s0036144595294515

zbMATH Keywords

graphpolytopegamestable matchingtwo-sided marketmarriage problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Three-dimensional polytopes (52B10) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (12)

On the independent dominating set polytope ⋮ Student admissions and faculty recruitment ⋮ One-node cutsets and the dominating set polytope ⋮ Unique stable matchings ⋮ Preference swaps for the stable matching problem ⋮ Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry) ⋮ Equitable representation and recruitment ⋮ A note on ex-ante stable lotteries ⋮ Finding All Stable Pairs and Solutions to the Many-to-Many Stable Matching Problem ⋮ The diameter of the stable marriage polytope: bounding from below ⋮ Polyhedral Aspects of Stable Marriage ⋮ Bipartite choices

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