Gains, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1997.9990204zbMath0890.92030OpenAlexW2046116155MaRDI QIDQ4384962

Werner Raub, Chris Snijders

Publication date: 22 June 1998

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1997.9990204

zbMATH Keywords

gainsrepeated gamesrisk preferencesconditional cooperationcollective actionsocial dilemmaslosses\(S\)-shaped utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items

Self-organizing collective action: group dynamics by collective reputation, Effect of the migration mechanism based on risk preference on the evolution of cooperation, Behavior in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Shifted Outcomes Analyzed with a Statistical Learning Model, Effects of individual decision theory assumptions on predictions of cooperation in social dilemmas

Cites Work

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• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• The Role of Attitude Toward Risk in Strictly Competitive Decision-Making Situations
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information