Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00229zbMath1047.91021OpenAlexW2033854831MaRDI QIDQ4419348

Matthew Shum, Han Hong

Publication date: 13 August 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00229

zbMATH Keywords

auctionspreferencesmonotone quantile approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (13)

Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions ⋮ Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Winner's curse in toll road concessions ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test ⋮ Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry ⋮ Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids ⋮ Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements ⋮ The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints ⋮ Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach ⋮ An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

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