Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00231zbMath1047.91050OpenAlexW3125142172MaRDI QIDQ4419351

Andrew Newman, Patrick Legros

Publication date: 13 August 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00231

zbMATH Keywords

large economiessurplus function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity ⋮ Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform ⋮ POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS ⋮ Offshoring, matching, and income inequality ⋮ A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result ⋮ Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents ⋮ Moral hazard and stability ⋮ Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents

This page was built for publication: Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds