Efficient methods for selfish network design
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2012.04.033zbMath1243.68029OpenAlexW2035766543WikidataQ59818405 ScholiaQ59818405MaRDI QIDQ442104
Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis
Publication date: 9 August 2012
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.04.033
Nash equilibriumpolynomial-time algorithmBraess's paradoxequilibrium flow delayslinear latencyparadox-ridden networkreal-world networksselfish flows
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Applications of game theory (91A80)
Related Items (5)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Worst-case equilibria
- Selfish splittable flows and NP-completeness
- A polynomial algorithm for minimum quadratic cost flow problems
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
- Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
- Uniqueness of solution in linear programming
- On sparse approximations to randomized strategies and convex combinations
- How much can taxes help selfish routing?
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- Simple strategies for large zero-sum games with applications to complexity theory
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games
- Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems
- Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
- Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
- Taxes for Linear Atomic Congestion Games
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Convex separable optimization is not much harder than linear optimization
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
This page was built for publication: Efficient methods for selfish network design