Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models

DOI10.1142/S021919890300101XzbMath1086.91018MaRDI QIDQ4433462

Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume

Publication date: 2003

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstochastic stabilityDiscrete choice models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• How noise matters.
• Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions