Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001057zbMath1058.91004OpenAlexW2098040364MaRDI QIDQ4433466

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date: 2003

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001057

zbMATH Keywords

learningbest reply dynamicsimitation dynamicsMixed-strategy Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (10)

Strategy selection in structured populations ⋮ Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency ⋮ Convergence of linear threshold decision-making dynamics in finite heterogeneous populations ⋮ When are efficient conventions selected in networks? ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ The \(\sigma\) law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population ⋮ General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions ⋮ Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games ⋮ BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES ⋮ Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments

Cites Work

• Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents
• An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
• An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
• Learning in games by random sampling
• Unnamed Item

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