Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001069zbMath1051.91007MaRDI QIDQ4433467

Alex Possajennikov

Publication date: 15 December 2003

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms ⋮ Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly ⋮ THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Experimentation, imitation, and stochastic stability
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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