All-or-nothing payments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.02.003zbMath1244.91054OpenAlexW2051005483MaRDI QIDQ443750

Bo Chen

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardall-or-nothing paymentsmultitask incentive contractsverifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Optimal task assignments

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

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