Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
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Publication:444122
DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2zbMath1259.91028OpenAlexW2057918496MaRDI QIDQ444122
Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent R. Merlin
Publication date: 13 August 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2
Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decision theory for games (91A35)
Related Items (5)
On avoiding vote swapping ⋮ Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Vote trading and subset sums ⋮ Axiomatic districting
Cites Work
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- Formal Structure of Majority Decision
- The Theory of Representative Majority Decision
- Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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