Gerrymander-proof representative democracies

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2zbMath1259.91028OpenAlexW2057918496MaRDI QIDQ444122

Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationfederal voting rulesGerrymandering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (5)

On avoiding vote swapping ⋮ Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Vote trading and subset sums ⋮ Axiomatic districting

Cites Work

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• Formal Structure of Majority Decision
• The Theory of Representative Majority Decision
• Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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