Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0299-1zbMath1259.91025OpenAlexW1985540394MaRDI QIDQ444135

Ryoji Sawa

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0299-1

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionlarge deviationsevolutionary game theorylarge populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory (91B51)

Related Items (2)

Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Evolution, population growth, and history dependence
• Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
• Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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