Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
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Publication:444137
DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0300-zzbMath1260.91011OpenAlexW1979427845MaRDI QIDQ444137
Publication date: 13 August 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2909319
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Cites Work
- Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
- Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
