How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0307-5zbMath1259.91022OpenAlexW2053483914MaRDI QIDQ444139

Gary E. Bolton, Jeannette E. Brosig-Koch

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0307-5

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcommunicationgame theorycoalitional bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Strategy and equity: An ERC-analysis of the Güth-van Damme game
• Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
• Encouraging a coalition formation
• How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
• Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Mergers and Acquisitions: An Experimental Analysis of Synergies, Externalities and Dynamics
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities

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