Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0342-xzbMath1245.91010OpenAlexW2031419574MaRDI QIDQ444143

Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Bertrand Tchantcho, Joël Moulen

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0342-x

zbMATH Keywords

dominancesimple gamedesirability relationinfluence relationpower relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power ⋮ On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval

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