ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

DOI10.1142/S0219198903000891zbMath1140.91313OpenAlexW2079155511MaRDI QIDQ4462685

Anders U. Poulsen

Publication date: 18 May 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903000891

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyevolutionary stabilitycommitmentBargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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