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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341 - MaRDI portal

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4471296

zbMath1094.68528MaRDI QIDQ4471296

Éva Tardos, Kunal Talwar, Aaron Archer, Christos H. Papadimitriou

Publication date: 28 July 2004


Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.



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