A Two-Person Conflict Model in Train Scheduling

DOI10.1142/S0219198903000921zbMath1120.91305MaRDI QIDQ4474566

Ferenc Szidarovszky, Keivan Ghoseiri, Mohammad Jawad Asgharpour

Publication date: 12 July 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto frontierKalai-Smorodinsky solutionnon-symmetric Nash solutionequal loss solutionarea monotonic solutionone-shot solution concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35)

Related Items (1)

Novel multi-objective resource allocation and activity scheduling for fourth party logistics

Cites Work

• The equal-loss principle for bargaining problems
• The Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• A STOCHASTIC BARGAINING PROCESS AND CORRESPONDING ONE-SHOT SOLUTION CONCEPT
• Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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