Intuitionism and the liar paradox

DOI10.1016/j.apal.2012.01.014zbMath1264.03031arXiv1004.2239OpenAlexW2963724946MaRDI QIDQ448337

Nikolai Weaver

Publication date: 6 September 2012

Published in: Annals of Pure and Applied Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.2239

zbMATH Keywords

liar paradoxsemantic paradoxesinternal model principleintuitionismformal mathematical proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Intuitionistic mathematics (03F55)

Cites Work

• Principles of intuitionism. Lectures presented at the summer conference on intuitionism and proof theory (1968) at SUNY at Buffalo, NY
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories
• Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals^†
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