THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (ENkAC-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198999000050zbMath1028.91512OpenAlexW2157053552MaRDI QIDQ4485673

T. Namekata, Theo S. H. Driessen

Publication date: 19 June 2000

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198999000050

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuetransferable utility gamescentre of the imputation set valueEgalitarian non-\(k\)-averaged contribution valueegalitarian non-pairwise-averaged contribution valueegalitarian non-separable contribution value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
• A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
• The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
• Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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