Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma

DOI10.1073/PNAS.96.19.10933zbMath1038.91503OpenAlexW2045933079WikidataQ35638869 ScholiaQ35638869MaRDI QIDQ4488618

James Andreoni, Hal R. Varian

Publication date: 1999

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.19.10933

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationsubgame perfect equilibriumPareto efficient

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (16)

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Cites Work

• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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