Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
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Publication:449038
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.003zbMath1247.91050OpenAlexW1969525800MaRDI QIDQ449038
Davide P. Cervone, Ronghua Dai, Ari Morse, Daniel Gnoutcheff, Grant Lanterman, Andrew Mackenzie, William S. Zwicker, Nikhil Srivastava
Publication date: 11 September 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.003
Related Items (7)
Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules ⋮ Spatial implementation ⋮ The pleasures of friends ⋮ The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids ⋮ A spatial analogue of May's theorem ⋮ A spatial analogue of May's theorem ⋮ Polarization in networks: identification-alienation framework
Uses Software
Cites Work
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