The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.004zbMath1247.91051OpenAlexW2032603054WikidataQ57542974 ScholiaQ57542974MaRDI QIDQ449041

Daniel Eckert, Frederik S. Herzberg

Publication date: 11 September 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2517869

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

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Cites Work

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