An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
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Publication:449045
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.005zbMath1246.91046OpenAlexW1970922082MaRDI QIDQ449045
Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, Hatem Smaoui, Vincent R. Merlin
Publication date: 11 September 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.005
Related Items (4)
The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results ⋮ Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules ⋮ A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
Uses Software
Cites Work
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