An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.005zbMath1246.91046OpenAlexW1970922082MaRDI QIDQ449045

Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, Hatem Smaoui, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 11 September 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

convex polytopevoting rulesscoring rulesEhrhart polynomials

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results ⋮ Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules ⋮ A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity

Uses Software

• LattE
• PolyLib

Cites Work

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• Self-selection consistent functions
• On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
• Polynômes arithmétiques et méthode des polyedres en combinatoire
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
• Effective lattice point counting in rational convex polytopes
• Points entiers dans les polyèdres convexes
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Counting Integral Points in Polyhedra When the Dimension is Fixed
• Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.

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