Implementation with partial provability
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Publication:449172
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.017zbMath1247.91054OpenAlexW2134750299MaRDI QIDQ449172
Elchanan Ben-Porath, Barton L. Lipman
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.017
Related Items
Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
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