Naive traders and mispricing in prediction markets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.020zbMath1247.91079OpenAlexW2153516420MaRDI QIDQ449182

Ricardo Serrano-Padial

Publication date: 12 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.020

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionprivate informationcommon valuesfavorite-longshot biasnaive tradersprediction markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (3)

A jump model for fads in asset prices under asymmetric information ⋮ Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and mispricing in financial markets ⋮ m-Double Poisson Lévy markets

Cites Work

• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
• Cursed Equilibrium

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