scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103
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zbMath0959.91014MaRDI QIDQ4495209
E. Kurbanov, Fuad T. Aleskerov
Publication date: 10 August 2000
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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