The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00133zbMath1028.91540OpenAlexW2095040162MaRDI QIDQ4503717

Ehud Lehrer, Zvika Neeman

Publication date: 14 September 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00133

zbMATH Keywords

informationindividuals' preferencesanonymous collective bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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