Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00135zbMath0985.90060OpenAlexW3123731417MaRDI QIDQ4503719

Chenggang Xu, Yingyi Qian, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 14 September 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00135

zbMATH Keywords

organization as a hierarchy of managers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (11)

Conditions of optimality of the divisional, the functional, and the matrix hierarchy of control ⋮ Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy ⋮ Organizational form, incentives and the management of information technology: opening the black box of outsourcing ⋮ Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure ⋮ Aid effectiveness and the soft budget constraint: EU development aid to the former Soviet Union ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation ⋮ Hotelling's competition with relative performance evaluation ⋮ Mathematical models of formation of rational organizational hierarchies ⋮ Do new mayors bring fresh air? Some evidence of regulatory capture in China ⋮ Task assignment and organizational form ⋮ Managerial overload and organization design

This page was built for publication: Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form