Optimal Multi-Object Auctions

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00139zbMath1055.91520MaRDI QIDQ4512698

Mark Armstrong

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (32)

Mixed bundling auctions ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies ⋮ Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions ⋮ Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives ⋮ Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ A demand partitioning framework to reserve production for small enterprises ⋮ Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions ⋮ Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics ⋮ Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects ⋮ Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ An introduction to mechanized reasoning ⋮ Local incentive compatibility with transfers ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets ⋮ Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results ⋮ Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect ⋮ Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing ⋮ Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders ⋮ Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors ⋮ Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs ⋮ An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective ⋮ On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist ⋮ Buyer groups as strategic commitments ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Optimal pricing and scheduling control of product shipping ⋮ Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry

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