VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM
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Publication:4521369
DOI10.1142/S0219198900000068zbMath1073.91576OpenAlexW2018342086MaRDI QIDQ4521369
María Paz Espinosa, Elena Inarra
Publication date: 19 March 2001
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000068
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
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