EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH TWO INDEPENDENT DECISIONS

DOI10.1142/S0219198900000081zbMath1073.91516OpenAlexW1979004417MaRDI QIDQ4521371

Ross Cressman, Jean-François Wen, Andrea Gaunersdorfer

Publication date: 2000

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000081

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games ⋮ Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Eco-evolutionary logic of mutualisms ⋮ An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in the multigame on a two-layer square network ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information

Cites Work

• On the dynamics of asymmetric games
• Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. II. Games between two populations without selfinteraction
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification
• An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games

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