Chaos, but in voting and apportionments?

DOI10.1073/pnas.96.19.10568zbMath1047.91527OpenAlexW2028919025WikidataQ36028804 ScholiaQ36028804MaRDI QIDQ4525771

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 24 January 2001

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.19.10568

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Applications of dynamical systems (37N99)

Cites Work

• The Borda dictionary
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
• The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• The Quota Method of Apportionment
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A chaotic Exploration of Aggregation Paradoxes