The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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Publication:452827
DOI10.1007/s00493-012-2704-1zbMath1265.05015arXiv0911.0517OpenAlexW2177286302MaRDI QIDQ452827
Elchanan Mossel, Marcus Isaksson, Guy Kindler
Publication date: 17 September 2012
Published in: Combinatorica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0911.0517
Related Items (12)
A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality ⋮ Probabilistic view of voting, paradoxes, and manipulation ⋮ Normalized range voting broadly resists control ⋮ A quantitative Arrow theorem ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey ⋮ The probability of intransitivity in dice and close elections ⋮ Between Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite. A representation theoretic approach ⋮ Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting ⋮ A law of large numbers for weighted plurality ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis ⋮ A tight quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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- Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Algorithms and Computation
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